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Mind, Brain, and Free Will

Richard Swinburne presents a powerful new case for substance dualism and for libertarian free will. He argues that pure mental events (including conscious events) are distinct from physical events and interact with them, and claims that no result from neuroscience or any other science could show that interaction does not take place. Swinburne goes on to argue for agent causation, and claims that it is we, and not our intentions, that cause our brain events. It ismetaphysically possible that each of us could acquire a new brain or continue to exist without a brain; and so we are essentially souls. Brain events and conscious events are so different from each other that it would not be possible to establish a scientific theory which would predict what each ofus would do in situations of moral conflict. Hence, we should believe that things are as they seem to be: that we make choices independently of the causes which influence us. It follows that we are morally responsible for our actions.

But many of the arguments by which I support those conclusions are different,
and—I believe—deeper and stronger, based on a full discussion of underlying
philosophical issues (e. g. the criteria for the identity of events and substances,
and the grounds for asserting that a certain state of affairs is metaphysically
possible) which underlie differences among philosophers about issues of mind
and body. Also, this book includes a far fuller, and to my mind far more
satisfactory, discussion ...