Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political Interest Groups
"Criticisms of Mancur Olson's theory of group membership and organizational behavior and discussions of the limits of his formulations are not new, but Terry Moe has set them forth in thoroughgoing fashion, has elaborated and extended them, and has made positive new contributions. The result is a book that is valuable and constructive, one that may well revive interest in the systematic study of political groups."—David B. Truman, American Political Science Review "The Organization of Interests is a valuable addition to the literature. It reminds us that the interior life of groups has political significance and gives us a conceptual framework for exploring that life. It balances nicely between the pluralists—who tend to interpret interest group behaviour entirely in political terms—and Olson—who has no satisfactory explanation for behaviour that is not attributable to economic self-interest. In the concept of the entrepreneur Moe gives us a useful analytical device which deserves operationalization. The book is well worth study."—A. Paul Pross, Canadian Journal of Political Science
For most students of politics, the major value of a theory of interest groups derives
from what it can say about group goals and, in particular, how they are formulated
as a function of member goals. This is understandable, given the perspectives
from which interest groups are commonly viewed. Whether they are seen as
active and sometimes powerful actors in the political system, as interest
articulators, as legitimate (or illegitimate) participants in the democratic process,
as agencies of ...
